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 Beyond Stop/Go?: Explaining Australia’s Long Boom 
 
 




The pattern of boom and bust that characterised the Australian economy from the early 
1970s to the early 1990s currently seem to be a thing of the past as Australia enters its sixteenth year of 
uninterrupted expansion.  The expansion has lasted twice as long as those of the 1970s and 1980s, 
which raises the question — why has it happened? 
 
Given the space constraints of this paper, one way of simplifying our approach to this 
question is to identify the major factors that previously precipitated major slumps or recessions. The 
major recessions of the mid 1970s, the early 1980s and the early 1990s, were induced by monetary 
policy and a determination by of the Treasury and Reserve Bank to slow an overheated economy.  The 
first two policy-induced recessions were aimed primarily at fighting inflation.  The recession of the 
early 1990s was a product of policy attempts to slow the economy in the face of a combined current 
account crisis and domestic financial overheating, particularly the credit-fuelled asset price inflation of 
the late 1980s.   
 
Our main task in this paper is to try and explain why these earlier recessionary drivers have 
thus far largely abated during the current expansion. This involves tracing two processes, the economic 
problems in question, and the policy responses to them, especially the monetary policy responses.   
 
Inflation, Financial Overheating and Monetary Policy 
 
Figure 1 charts CPI inflation against short-term interest rates since 1970 and indicates that 
periods of high inflation in Australia have often been associated with the imposition of high short term 




































Inflation and short term interest rates, 1970-2007. 
 
This pattern is particularly clear during the 1974-5 recession and again in the early 1980s recession.  
The relationship breaks down somewhat during the remainder of the 1980s because the interest rate 
spikes of 1986 and 1989 both occurred amidst only modest increases in headline inflation and amidst 
more or less persistent falls in underlying inflation.  As argued below, the high interest rate response of 
the late 1980s was primarily intended to fight other problems, such as domestic financial overheating 
and current account problems.  
 
Australia’s inflation problem, especially during the 1970s and early 1980s, was largely 
driven by pressures from labor markets.  As Kalecki (1943) had predicted, the full employment of the 
post-war ‘golden age’ had greatly strengthened labor’s position in distributional conflicts over wages 
and profits.  When growth slowed in the 1970s the struggle intensified to produce stagflation, 
manifested as rising wages despite recession.  The recessions of the 1970s and the early 1980s saw 
large spikes in labour’s share of national income (Bell 1997: 92–93).  
 
 The centralised arbitration and wage fixing system meant that wage increases typically 
emanating from the manufacturing sector would spill across the economy.  This effect was further 
promoted by tariff protection, which meant that the manufacturing sector could typically pass on costs 
to consumers and other sectors.  This combination of labour empowering economic conditions at the 
tail end of the post-war boom helped fuel the intense distributional struggles of the 1970s and early 
1980s. 
 
Despite securing wage increases, labour interests increasingly became disillusioned with 
this kind of raw distributional struggle. The early 1980s recession did not erode the pay increases 
associated with the ‘resources boom’ that preceded it, but over one hundred thousand jobs were lost in 
manufacturing alone. The unions decided to co-operate with the Labor governments of the 1980s to forge a new approach based on corporatist wage moderation institutionalised within the post-1983 
Prices and Incomes Accords (Stilwell 1986).  The resulting wage moderation contributed a significant 
overall fall in underlying inflation during the 1980s.  Accordingly, Bob Johnston, the  Governor of the 
Reserve Bank during the 1980s, commented that, ‘it did not seem practical to single out price stability 
as the focus of monetary policy’ (Bell 2004: 54, original emphasis). 
 
A number of things happened to change this trajectory; change which wrecked the 
expansionary momentum of Labor’s Accord and eventually saw inflation return as the focus of policy.  
The first problem was that the monetary authorities handled the process of post-1983 financial 
deregulation badly.  Credit liberalisation and slack prudential supervision helped produce a major 
credit explosion and an asset price boom by the decade’s end, especially in property.  This overheating 
was accompanied by a more generalized boom which saw the current account deficit rise to levels 
widely seen as unsustainable.  The current account, rather than inflation, became the immediate target 
of policy.  The second problem was that the authorities badly miscalculated their policy response to the 
boom.   
 
The details of Australia’s first major experience of a post-deregulation asset boom (and 
subsequent bust) are sufficiently well known not to need recounting here (Bell 2004: 47–50).  But the 
second problem above – the policy misreading and blundering into a recession – warrants brief 
attention.  There were errors in forecasting.  The scale of the boom and subsequent crash were not 
foreseen.   
 
Policy confidence in avoiding a recession was boosted by the fact that the peak level of interest 
rates at the end of 1989 was lower than during the previous steep tightening in 1985 and lower than 
those that precipitated a recession in the early 1980s.  Also, the share market crash of 1987 appeared to 
indicate that an asset price bubble could burst without doing much damage to the real economy.  There 
was also the false impression generated by the experience of 1985–86; that the use of very high interest 
rates that peaked in late 1985 could be followed by a soft landing.  Given subsequent events, this was a 
fundamental misreading.  Nor was there sufficient recognition that the boom of the late 1980s was 
largely driven by a new, form of asset inflation in property markets.   
 
Nobody knew exactly what the effects of high interest rates would be in a deregulated, credit 
saturated financial system.  As the RBA now puts it, there was an ongoing ‘calibration’ problem with 
the interest rate weapon.  Some insiders have also claimed that the policy making procedure at the time 
was too myopic and that there was a tendency to look backwards at existing data for guidance on the 
effects of policy that were not likely to impact on the economy for as much as a year ahead.   
 
Prior to the recession the Governor of the Reserve Bank, Bernie Fraser, had quipped that: 
‘People generally feel that inflation is bad, but… not so bad that they want the authorities to get too serious about eliminating it’ (Fraser 1990: 20). The journalist, Michael Stutchbury (1989), called this 
Fraser’s ‘mission impossible’.  But once the monetary authorities and the government had blundered 
into the recession, it became apparent to the RBA and the Treasury, that a new and perhaps successful 
final assault on inflation might be something that could be salvaged from the wreckage. As the RBA’s 
former Deputy Governor, Stephen Grenville, has commented, the ‘mindset’ changed within the Bank.   
 
The rapidly improvised policy response was too hold up rates for longer to help achieve the new 
goal.  Probably the frankest admission of this has come from the then Deputy Governor, Ian 
Macfarlane:  
It may have been possible to have a somewhat smaller recession if all the policy 
guns had been quickly turned towards maximum expansionary impact.  But if 
we had followed this course how could people credibly have believed we were 
serious about reducing inflation? …The central point is that on this occasion we 
had to run monetary policy somewhat tighter than in earlier recessions and take 
the risk that the fall in output would be greater… (Bell 2004: 71). 
 
Given the depth and length of the recession in the early 1990s, inflation fell rapidly, and 
expectations about inflation followed suit.  This episode broke the back of inflation and since the 
recession the CPI inflation rate has been low and relatively steady.  By 1993 the RBA was feeling 
confident enough about inflation to devise its own inflation targeting system.  During the ensuring 
economic boom inflation has remained near the centre of the RBA’s target range, averaging around 2.6 
per cent. The current (2007) inflation rate is no higher than at the start of the boom, although 
inflationary pressures have been building recently. 
 
Why have Australia’s inflation outcomes changed so much?  First, the labour market has 
changed.  Prolonged unemployment from the 1970s to the aftermath of the early 1990s recession 
helped ‘discipline’ labour.  The recession saw unemployment rise from around 430,000 to over a 
million.  Moreover, the subsequent employment recovery was slow.  Second, such disciplinary 
measures have been paralleled by structural change in the economy which has seen the rapid growth of 
non unionized service sector employment and employment declines in traditionally unionized 
manufacturing sectors.  This has helped reduce union density and also rendered many forms of 
employment less secure; again acting as a discipline.  Third, in the wake of the recession, the industrial 
relations system was fundamentally changed by Labor’s introduction of enterprise bargaining.  This 
placed more power in the hands of employers, further disciplined labour and assisted in limiting the 
economy wide impacts of pay increases in particular sectors.   
 
The result of both of these sets of changes meant that the post recession expansion did not see 
a return of rapid wages growth of the kind that had previously fuelled inflation.  This was probably the 
major turn around. Over the fourteen years to the middle of 2005, labour costs increased only 27 per 
cent, compared to 144 per cent over the fourteen years prior to this (Edwards 2006: 72).  Fourth, the unwillingness of employers to countenance large wage rises was also reinforced by another major 
change in the long standing ‘Australian settlement’ policy framework; the shift towards tariff reform 
and lower protection.  The tariff reductions, which had been underway since the 1970s, with additional 
reductions in the late 1980s and early 1990s, dramatically increased competitive pressure on exposed 
business sectors and made them both less willing and able to pass on cost increases into prices, as had 
traditionally been the case 
 
Finally, in the wake of the bruising recession and growing anti-inflation credentials of the 
RBA, all players became increasingly aware of the potential costs of a renewed round of inflation.  The 
Bank would act decisively if needed to curb it.  The first significant post recession test for the RBA 
came in 1994 as inflationary pressures rose and rates were tightened pre-emptively in three steps by 
275 basis points over five months.  Growth slowed briefly but inflation was checked and the economy 
continued on an expansionary path.  The RBA’s growing credibility in the markets was illustrated by 
the fact that, by 1996, the yield on Australian government bonds had dropped below that of New 
Zealand’s for the first time in over a decade; indicating that investors considered Australia’s prospects 
for low inflation superior to the once lauded New Zealand model (Macfarlane 2006: 87). 
 
As outlined above, part of this new stability was derived from the fact that the 
RBA was now dealing with an economy less prone to inflation.  In this context, the RBA’s 
key strategy has been to develop a flexible inflation targeting regime involving a 2–3 per 
cent inflation target, to be achieved on average over a run of years. In practice, this target is 
implemented through a ‘Taylor rule’ in which both the rate of inflation and the rate of economic 
growth are targeted, with the underlying assumption being that deviations of either variable from target 
values are both undesirable and unsustainable.  
 
Critics claimed the framework was too vague and flexible.  As the RBA’s former Governor, 
Ian Macfarlane commented: ‘people said that this was a sign of weakness.  So ours was definitely 
regarded — of the half dozen models then available — as being the softest of the spectrum’. (Bell 
2004: 83)  Critics also pointed out that the RBA’s target was on the high side and praised the more 
hawkish 0–2 per cent inflation targets that had been established in New Zealand and Canada. But as 
Macfarlane (1998: 13) noted: ‘We regarded this as probably too low, and certainly too narrow a range.  
No country had achieved this sort of inflation performance over any significant time interval in the past 
50 years’.  Bernie Fraser observed that, ‘The target was seen as weak by those that favoured the New 
Zealand benchmark; we chose very deliberately not to adopt such a benchmark’ (Bell 2004: 81–86).  
 
Emblematic of the Bank’s cautious post-recession approach was the response to the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997–1998.  During the crisis, market concerns about the potential fallout in 
Australia, particularly with respect to exports, were reflected in a depreciating currency.  The Bank 
could have attempted to defend the currency, ward off any potential imported inflation, and appease 
market concerns by adopting higher interest rates, but it chose not to.  The floating rate regime provided an effective buffer.  The Reserve Bank allowed the Australia–US exchange rate to depreciate 
to 50 cents, in line with the depreciation of Asian currencies. As a result, demand for Australian 
exports remained relatively strong. Along with a shift to more expansionary fiscal policy, partially 
reversing the Budget cuts of 1996, the result was that Australia was almost entirely unaffected by the 
crisis, earning the label ‘miracle economy’ from Paul Krugman (1998).  
 
Under the fixed-rate regime the Bank would have been forced to defend the currency, with a 
domestic recession as the likely result.  The net effect of the Bank’s response was to cushion the impact 
on the domestic economy and to absorb the shock on the exchange rate.  Crucially, interest rates were 
not raised and domestic growth and employment were protected.  John Edward of HSBC, comments 
that Macfarlane did well: ‘A more easily rattled Governor, someone with less monetary experience, 
someone with more reliance on models and theories and less on accumulated wisdom, would quite 
easily have cost Australia billions of dollars in lost output and a hundred thousand jobs’ (quoted in 
Burrell 1999).  The contrast with the more hawkish stance adopted in New Zealand and Canada is 
instructive.  The central banks in both countries chose a more orthodox approach.  They raised interest 
rates, tried to support the currency and landed in a policy-induced recession.   
 
Table 1 shows data on economic growth, inflation and interest rates across a range of leading 
economies for the 1980s and 1990s. 
 




Average GDP Growth 
(%) 




       
 1980's 
1990–





Australia  3.3  3.6  0.3  7.9  2.2  -5.7  15.2  6.4  -8.8 
New 
Zealand  2.5  2.8  0.3  10.8  2.0  -8.8  17.3  7.4  -9.9 
Japan  4.6  1.7  -2.8  2.1  0.8  -1.2  6.1  2.1  -4.1 
Canada  2.8  2.7  -0.1  6.0  2.0  -4.0  11.2  5.7  -5.5 
USA  3.0  3.0  0.0  4.7  2.8  -1.9  9.9  5.2  -4.7 
Germany  1.8  2.2  0.4  2.6  2.4  -0.3  6.8  5.3  -1.4 
France  2.4  1.7  -0.7  6.4  1.8  -4.6  11.3  5.9  -5.3 
Italy  2.4  1.5  -0.9  9.9  3.8  -6.1  15.1  8.3  -6.8 
UK  2.4  2.0  -0.4  6.2  3.2  -2.9  11.7  7.1  -4.6 
OECD 
Major 7  2.7  2.2  -0.5  5.2  2.1  -3.1  10.3  5.7  -4.6 
Source: IMF (World Economic Database), OECD  
 The Australian economy in the post-recession 1990s has been at the top of the OECD economic growth 
league table and has outperformed even the United States in terms of both growth and inflation 
performance.  As Macfarlane (2000: 2) argued in a speech in September 2000, ‘the fact that Australia 
has been virtually at the top of the international growth league, while achieving a respectable middle 
order ranking on inflation, shows that we have not over-emphasised inflation control at the expense of 
economic growth.’  He admits, ‘I’m regarded amongst the central Bank community as being a bit of a 
wet’ (interview, November, 2001).  Indeed, the RBA’s approach has helped promote a less restrictive 
orthodoxy amongst central bankers (especially compared to the once-lionised New Zealand model) 
aimed at long sustainable expansions (Bell 2005). Commenting on the RBA’s approach, Macfarlane 
thinks, ‘there’s been a shift in our direction.  There is no doubt about that’: 
The single [inflation] objective is being questioned… there was this sort of feeling 
that if you were a central banker and you were caught worrying about something 
other than inflation, well you know, you should be gotten rid of….that has 
certainly changed.  I think the other thing too that has changed is there used to be a 
lot of veneration for the Bundesbank.. its representing orthodoxy.  And I think of 
the success of the Fed, the US Fed, during the 1990s… the Fed has really got 
pragmatic…its got dual objectives.  And so I think the success of the Fed and the 
demise of the Bundesbank have probably been the biggest single 
influences….[Also] the New Zealanders have made some mistakes as you know.  I 
mean they had the recession they didn’t have to have in 98 (interview, November, 
2001). 
 
Some international economists, such as Joseph Stiglitz (1998), have argued the case for ‘cautious 
expansionism, suggesting that the costs of inflation have been overstated, the costs of disinflationary 
policies understated, and that evidence that moderate rates of inflation actually damage the economy is 
hard to find (see also Fortin 2001; Akerlof 1996; Bell 1999).  Stiglitz also argues that the costs of 
higher inflation incurred in driving unemployment somewhat below the so-called ‘structural rate of 
unemployment’ or the NAIRU are likely to be small compared to the gains based on a more 
expansionary stance. 
 
Overall, the challenge of dealing with inflation will remain an important focus of the RBA.  
Nevertheless, structural and institutional changes within the economy and the now much more clearly 
defined monetary policy approach of the RBA will hopefully help reduce the changes of a return to the 
dark days of stop/go.   
 
 
Beyond the Current Account 
 
The great challenge for the Keynesian policymakers of the post-war era was that of maintaining simultaneous internal and external balance. In perhaps, the most important single 
Australian contribution to macroeconomic theory, Swan (1955, 1963) graphed internal and external 
balance and prescribed an appropriate mixture of fiscal policy and exchange rate policy to maintain 
equilibrium. Swan’s analysis was particularly appropriate in the light of Australia’s experience in the 
Great Depression, which was manifested first as a foreign exchange and foreign debt crisis. The policy 
imperative of maintaining a fixed exchange rate with sterling, which was in turn tied to gold, made any 
expansionary response to the Depression impossible.   
 
By contrast, analysis based on the Swan diagram prescribed depreciation of the currency as 
the appropriate policy response to a problem of sustained trade deficits, combined with demand 
management based on fiscal policy to maintain internal balance. In practice, given the political costs 
associated with both depreciation and appreciation, policymakers adopted a range of instruments, 
including a lengthy period of import licensing, to maintain external balance.  For several decades after 
World War II, this combination of policies worked reasonably well. Although Australia was mostly in 
net deficit, and there was a steady stream of critical commentary on the extent to which this implied 
foreign ownership and control of major companies, the trade and current accounts remained reasonably 
close to balance.   
 
After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, management of 
exchange rates became more difficult. With other currencies fluctuating, the exchange rate was pegged 
to a basket of currencies and adjusted daily. The floating of the exchange rate in 1983 was expected to 
resolve the foreign exchange problem once and for all. Most analysts assumed that foreign exchange 
markets would adjust to bring trade in goods and service to a net position close to balance, without the 
need for government intervention. It was also assumed that, provided macroeconomic policy was 
stable, then exchange rates would also be relatively stable. Although speculation was expected, most 
analysts assumed that speculators would act as a stabilising force, buying the currency when the 
exchange rate fell significantly below its long-run equilibrium value, and selling when the currency 
was overvalued.  
 
These assumptions were rapidly invalidated after the move to floating exchange rates. Global 
exchange rates were far more volatile than had been expected, and,  far from bringing goods and 
services trade into balance, the relaxation of constraints on international capital flows facilitated the 
development of large and sustained imbalances.  Australia was no exception to this pattern, and has 
experienced sustained current account deficits, averaging over 5 per cent of GDP, with a corresponding 
increase in net external liabilities, to around 60 per cent of GDP (Belkar, Cockerell and Kent 2007). 
These levels are very high by the standards of the period since World War II.  Australia had much 
higher ratios of debt to GDP in the late 19
th century and in the 1920s. In both cases, the growth in debt 
was followed by depression. 
 
Policymakers responded to the growth of current account deficits and external liabilities on the basis of assumptions that reflected the experience of fixed exchange rate systems.  Attempts to 
satisfy, and sometimes to manipulate, the expectations of financial markets were a central theme of 
economic policy in the 1980s. The appreciation of the Australian dollar after the float was seen as 
evidence that the market was confident in the future of the Australian economy and in its management 
by the Hawke-Keating government. It was in this period that Keating won the award from Euromoney 
magazine that led to his being labelled, sometimes seriously and sometimes derisively, as the ‘World’s 
Greatest Treasurer’.  Conversely the sharp decline in the value of the dollar in the mid-1980s was  seen 
as evidence that the market had lost confidence in the economy and its management, leading to mid-
decade concerns about Australia becoming (in the Treasurer’s words) a ‘Banana Republic.’  This crisis 
was managed successfully, with a short-lived increase in interest rates that depressed domestic demand, 
reducing the current account deficit and restoring market confidence in the Australian economy. 
 
However, an attempt to repeat the ‘short sharp shock’ treatment in 1988 and 1989 went 
disastrously wrong, leading to the most severe recession in Australia’s post-war history. Although 
retrospective accounts, particularly from the Reserve Bank, present the operations of monetary policy 
as being primarily driven by concerns about inflation, many contemporary observers, such as Tingle 
(1994) were in no doubt about the fact that the main target of policy was the current account deficit. As 
Edwards (2006) notes, the Reserve Bank stated in its 1988 Annual Report that the tightening began as a 
response to higher imports threatening ‘the improving trend in the balance of payments’, as well as a 
response to growth in earnings and prices threatening ‘the downward trend in inflation’. It was widely 
argued that any relaxation of policy could not be undertaken until after a turnaround in the CAD had 
been observed.  
 
The most prominent critic of the dominant approach was Pitchford (1989). In a series of 
articles and other publications, he argued that, following deregulation, the current account balance had 
ceased to be a relevant target for macroeconomic policy, and particularly the setting of interest rates. In 
the absence of large government borrowing, the current account balance was simply the aggregate of 
borrowing and lending transactions between individuals and firms in Australia and overseas. If these 
transactions turned out badly, that was a problem for the parties concerned, or perhaps for prudential 
regulation, but not for governments.  This ‘consenting adults’ view achieved complete dominance in 
the aftermath of the recession, to the extent that it is virtually impossible to find anyone in a policy 
position who admits to having ever held the opposite view. The shift in emphasis away from monetary 
policy targeting the current account deficit is illustrated in the following chart.  The shift clearly occurs 




















































































Sources: Bell (2004, p54), Reserve Bank of Australia 
Figure 2 
Cash Rate and Current Account Deficit, 1974/75 – 2000/01. 
 
The removal of, or at least the Reserve Bank’s willingness to disregard, the external balance 
constraint has been a crucial factor in permitting the current long expansion.  These days, neither the 
exchange rate nor the current account deficit is targeted.  In the absence of such targeting, the current 
account deficit has remained at high levels, reflecting a decline in household savings.  Many of these 
developments are common to the English-speaking countries as a group. In particular, the United States 
has also experienced large trade and current account deficits and a decline in household savings. As in 
Australia, the willingness of foreign investors to buy US securities, including bonds, equity and 
mortgage-based securities has been taken to show that the current account deficit should not be a target 
of policy. 
The success of the policy of benign neglect regarding the current account has been 
underpinned, in recent years, by a reversal of the long-standing historical trend towards declining terms 
of trade for Australian resource exports, as a result of the massive growth in demand from China. The 
trade balance has improved, and capital inflows have been directed to investment in mining and related 
activities. The trade balance has improved, but remains in deficit. It is salutary to note that sustained 
surpluses of around 1 per cent of national income are needed if the ratio of foreign liabilities to national 
income is to be stabilised (Edwards 2006; Gruen and Sayegh 2005). 
 
As long as the ‘consenting adults’ view continues to prevail globally, there seems little 
reason to expect that the external balance constraint will bite in Australia, even though the ratio of 
foreign liabilities to national income continues to rise, well beyond levels that have historically been 
regarded as unsustainable. The only real risk is that of a loss of confidence in the US, flowing through to other heavily indebted English-speaking countries in the same way as the Asian crisis, beginning in 
Thailand, spread throughout the region.  
 
If such a loss of confidence is ever to occur, it seems likely that it will be precipitated by the 
credit market failures evident in the breakdown of the US sub-prime mortgage market, beginning in 
mid-2007. Thus far, however, although there has been some disarray in financial markets, the main 
effect has been to drive down interest rates on official US government debt, suggesting that confidence 
in the US financial system as a whole remains strong.  The disappearance (or disregard) of the external 
balance constraint has been crucial in permitting the continuation of the long boom, well past the point 
when contractionary fiscal or monetary policies would have been applied in the past. The prosperity of 
the boom has been accompanied by steady growth in the ratio of external debt to GDP. It remains 
unclear at what level, if any, this ratio will ultimately stabilise and whether this process of stabilisation 
will be smooth or painful.  
 
Conclusion 
    This paper has attempted to analyse the major drivers of Australia’s pattern of stop/go 
economic instability from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s.  We saw that the major proximate causes 
of instability were monetary policy induced recessions, particularly in the face of major inflation and 
current account challenges.   The boom since the early 1990s has been marked by an absence of such 
challenges.  Inflation has been successfully managed thus far and the current account has, in a 
remarkable turn around, ceased to be a target of policy.   
 
  Given the clarity of hindsight now obtainable regarding the current boom, what is somewhat 
surprising is that no one predicted it.  Also, of note is that the boom has occurred in a neoliberal era that 
has been marked by major bouts of financial instability.  Thus far in the current boom such forces have 
not wreaked havoc on Australia.  Nevertheless, the challenges of asset inflation are unlikely to recede 
and may well worsen (Bell and Quiggin 2006).  Also, the continued debt build up in Australia poses 
major potential challenges.  Nor has the business cycle been banished.  Here the most likely cause of 
the next major slow down could well result from slow downs in our major trading partners, such as 
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